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In this paper it is argued that locus of control beliefs and preferences concerning state action negatively 
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new self-employment can be explained by inert informal institutions. 
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1I.  Introduction 
The collapse of the communist bloc and accompanying abrupt changes in the lives of many million 
people represents a profound transformation that touches on deep constitutional and institutional issues. 
Ultimately, it is a question of how a complex system, such as human society endogenously renews itself 
so that it might eventually provide a framework in which entrepreneurship is channeled toward productive 
activities, despite being grounded in a history of zero sum exchange and political corruption.  
  A successful transformation is intricately linked to the notion of entrepreneurship. Despite a lack 
of consensus concerning the precise meaning of the term, scholars agree that entrepreneurial behavior 
represents a key aspect of the workings of a market economy. One scholarly approach to entrepreneurship 
may ask the question “how, by whom, and with what effects opportunities to create future goods and 
services are discovered, evaluated, and exploited” [Shane and Venkataraman, 2000]. Of course, 
entrepreneurs are not necessarily involved in the creation of societal wealth as in the case of arbitrage or 
innovation. Depending on the incentivizing framework, they may also engage in rent seeking and thereby 
reduce overall prosperity [Baumol, 1996]. The question is thus, not whether entrepreneurship exists at all 
but about the specific manifestation it takes. The ubiquity of the human drive toward individual 
betterment may be channeled into different directions depending on the perceived whereabouts of the 
most lucrative opportunities.  
  The framework that guides entrepreneurs toward productive or unproductive activities has been 
studied under the name of Institutions [see North, 1990; and North, 2005]. Institutions have been defined 
as the “rules of the game”. There exist three sources of rules: the constitution, policies and informal social 
rules. In close analogy to Buchanan (1974, and 1985), the game metaphor invokes a two stage process. 
The first stage is characterized by the creation of rules (e.g. in the form of a constitution). The second 
stage is then characterized by interactions within the generated set of constraints (e.g. market interaction). 
The static game-like formulation is utilized by economists who regard themselves as advisors and active 
manipulators of the social process. In contrast, I will take a positive approach that tries to analyze some of 
the deep social complexities concerning transitional economies.   
2   Without denying the effect of constitutional and political rules on policies and market outcomes 
[see Pearson & Tabellini, 2003; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005], the different development trajectories for 
highly successful countries such as Poland or the Czech Republic and less successful ones, such as the 
Ukraine or Russia twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall confront us with the limits of the human 
ability to device and plan complex systems – a theme that has been most potently portrayed by Hayek 
(1960, 1973). Although we do know that market institutions such as secure property rights and sound 
monetary policy are the reason for diverging trajectories [See Frye & Shleifer,1997], we know very little 
about why some countries transformed their institutions more successfully than others. The 
transplantation of a western-style constitution into a post-socialist economy is riddled with a myriad of 
problems and cannot be seen as a copy-paste approach to development. As Boettke et al (2008) 
demonstrated, institutional transfers are dependent on the structural context in the host environment as 
influenced by economic, political and social realities that cannot be anticipated in its entirety.  
Disregarding bigger issues of constitutional change I intend to explore how minds that developed 
during a prolonged period of socialism will be influenced in their actions even after the constraints that 
molded such minds have long vanished into the dust of history. The paper contributes marginally to 
questions of ideology formation and change [Higgs, 2008]. Most importantly, it combines the particular 
strand of institutional/transitional economics [North, 2005; Boettke et al.2008] with entrepreneurship 
research (Kirzner, 1979; Shane& Venkataraman, 2000) and economic sociology. In response to Pryor 
(2007) who, on the basis of cluster analysis, claims that there is no cultural difference between east and 
west Germany, this paper shows that rates of self-employment in East Germany are reduced as a result of 
finer, less aggregate, finer, and well established cultural differences,  namely people‟s agency beliefs and 
preferences for state interventions.  
The remaining paper is structures as follows. Section II describes the process by which 
individuals develop certain inert agency beliefs and preferences concerning state intervention in socialist 
environments. Section III applies these insights to entrepreneurship theory. In section IV the empirical 
analysis is set up by focusing on rates of self-employment in the eastern and western part of Germany 
3after 1990. Section V presents alternative hypotheses. Data and results are discussed in section VI, VII, 
VIII, and IX.  Section X concludes.  
 
I.  Imprinting & Societal Change – The Case of East Germany 
 
East Germans lived under totalitarian rule between 1933 and 1989. The conscious design of a new 
fascist or socialist image of man was, of course, as futile as economic planning itself. As it is impossible 
to gather and process enough knowledge in order to centrally plan an immensely complex network of 
production processes efficiently, it is equally impossible to gather enough knowledge and process it in 
order to engineer millions of minds in a detailed manner.   Apart from the knowledge problem, the 
structure of the polity is another reason for why unintended consequences prevail. The state does not act 
as a single planner. It is a polycentric arrangement of multiple organizations that represents an array of 
partly compatible and partly conflicting interests. On the other hand mind and society are not independent 
and whatever policy emerges from the political network will have some unintended consequences and 
changes individual perception and therefore, behavior [see Wagner, 2006; Wagner, 2007. p.190]. I claim 
that a typical set of preferences and beliefs which represents an optimal adjustment to a life under 
socialism can be described. Preferences are defined as elements in a utility function. Beliefs essentially 
pertain to constraints, but also to general causal connections in the social world and morality. Once the 
institutional environment changed, beliefs and preferences traits did not adjust immediately, but displayed 
inertia.  
In contrast to a evolutionary framework in which preferences and beliefs are subject to choice and 
will be adopted if optimal [see Frank, 1987] or given as genetic endowments [Becker and Stigler, 1977], 
an alternative approach renders the dynamics of the mind as at least partially resting above the realm of 
choice. A distinguished minority of economists, such as Adam Smith (1759), Hume (1740), Pareto (1935) 
and North (2005) have followed a similar approach. In their frameworks, the individual does not have 
complete control of its inner world, but it is formed by social processes. Smith and Hume stress 
adolescence as the critical period for the formation of one‟s character. Individuals discover successful 
4ways and less successful ways of actions. When successful actions are repeated beliefs about causal 
connection are engrained in the mind. This belief then serves as a short cut approach to decision making 
in the future. Despite being a distinct category, beliefs are correlated with personality traits [Rallapalli et 
al, 1994].  It has been shown that measures of personality, such as Myers-Briggs have been found to be 
volatile up to the age of thirty, after which they stay remarkably constant [see Costa and McRae, 1997]. 
People cannot discard their beliefs, preferences, or personality as they see fit. But neither are people 
trapped in their views of the world. Beliefs are dearly held, like a worn out hat which does not fit this 
year‟s fashion trend. At some point the owner is going to exchange it for a new one, but not without a 
feeling of parting and loss. There is a necessary and ongoing time lag between the change of the external 
environment and the personal adjustment to it.  
Buchanan (1997) suggests that a conjectural history that is not based on free exchange between 
independent individuals, but one of collectives, where a leader assigns tasks, and no viable exit strategy 
exists creates a command culture with different presuppositions concerning the economy compared to the 
one that we take for granted in western societies. In such a context, the person who engages in profit 
seeking activities necessarily neglects to work toward the assigned group quota and is therefore regarded 
as a rule breaker. It is true that in this environment the pursuit of individual profit creates spillover 
damage for the remaining group. Thus, it evokes „a heightened sense of envy at the differential success at 
anyone who is seen to have secured such success by departing from group rules (Buchanan, 1997, p.100). 
Furthermore, in a mostly zero-sum politicized economy with prices below market clearing levels, sellers 
will not behave as if the customer‟s interest is his own – but possesses some degree of monopoly power 
which can be used to receive non-pecuniary payments. 
In addition to Buchanan‟s insight it can be claimed that command economies affect personal agency 
beliefs which are defined as subjective beliefs about the extent to which one is able to exert influence over 
the events in one‟s life. The concept was first introduced by Rotter (1966) and can be subdivided into the 
related concepts of Locus of Control (LOC) and self-efficacy beliefs. LOC captures whether the 
individual believes she can manipulate external events or whether they are dependent on luck, fate, 
powerful others, or other external forces. Self-efficacy refers to the individual belief about whether one 
5possesses the mental capacity and skill set that is required to make things happen. Where LOC pertains to 
the general possibility of an individual‟s influence over its environment, self-efficacy (or competency) 
beliefs pertain much more narrowly to its ability of actually doing so. 
Powerful others are a primary determinant of one‟s path in life in a command economy. Personal 
inclinations and effort for example play a smaller role for career trajectories. Instead, factors not subject 
to rational choice as construed by economics (family ties and background, religious beliefs and so forth) 
affect what school you attend or whether you would go on to college. The link between deliberate choice 
and payoff at work is blurred when every worker receives a flat wage in addition to guaranteed job 
security. The daycare a child attends and the apartment one lives in are assigned, and not a result of 
conscientious choice. The consumption goods one buys, which reflect a deliberate choice by the 
individual in western societies, are standardized to a much greater extent. Many East Germans were 
overwhelmed by the range of choices that grocery shopping involved when the ventured into the West 
Germany for the first time. Yet, every such choice makes the individual see herself as the ultimate source 
of change in her life. It reinforces a sense of deliberateness as opposed to being tossed around by forces 
beyond its reach. Thus, socialism furthers the belief that external forces are the primary determinants of 
the individual‟s life events. 
The German Democratic Republic was a totalitarian police state. Within a society of less than 20 
million, comprehensive files were kept on 6 million citizens, the majority of the adult work force [Fisher, 
Gelb, 199, p.92]. An intricate network of about 185,000 existed [Fullbrook, 1995,p.46-50]. It included 
ordinary people who spied on their neighbors and “friends” (Informelle Mitarbeiter – IMs). Apart from 
the inner most private family circle, an individual stands under permanent political surveillance. Because 
the results of this monitoring feeds back into decision that are made about people‟s life by political 
authorities, it can be seen how extra-family sphere requires one to be cautious and constantly alert. It is 
important to develop a sense of what others think about me. If this practice is repeated a feeling of being 
judged and evaluated by others becomes an important input into one‟s beliefs about one‟s competency. In 
contrast, a western society in which there is a much weaker link between other‟s assessment of my 
behavior and personal gain provides ground for genuine learning about one‟s self-efficacy in various 
6areas of life. If I get a feedback from my choices and if the feedback signal is not dominated by political 
views, clothing or religious preferences it is easier to develop feelings of competency. If the other‟s 
judgment affects the quality of the individual‟s life, it is critical to keep a low profile in a public setting. 
Self-confidently departing from expected behavioral patterns marks the individual as a deviator and 
makes him subject to suspicion and gossip.     
As discussed above, it is impossible to engineer the socialist man who acts in accordance with official 
doctrine. People respond to incentives. Effort is a function of pay and monitoring, not a generalized love 
for the proletariat. After all, it was due to the disillusionment with their state, that millions of East 
Germans marched on the streets in order to demonstrate their protest. Yet East Germany lacked a history 
of markets. The natural human instinct towards planned order [Hayek, 1988] was nourished through a 
lack of counterexamples. Despite their knowledge of the prosperity in western economies individuals in 
East Germany are critical of the market on justice grounds. They did not experience how the poorest 
members of society are made better off as a result of developing markets. Thus, even if East Germans 
were not satisfied with results of the particular socialist state the opposition movement never claimed that 
socialism is not viable in principle [see Dale, 2005, p.4]. On October 23
rd, 1989, when more than 300,000 
citizen marched through the streets of Leipzig in order to start a „revolution from below […] all of the 
speakers advocated changing the DDR [translated GDR], not abandoning it‟ [Allen, 1991, p.187]. 
Psychologists Schwartz & Bardi, 1997 have shown how beliefs in hierarchy, propriety and constraint are 
adopted in order to reduce the discrepancy between what is desired and what can be done. The effect is 
well established in psychology and is often referred to as „rationalization‟ [see Jost & Banaji, 1994; 
Lerner, 1980]. 
Of course people will adjust their beliefs once the external environment does not confirm the old 
mental constructs any longer. The process is not instantaneous and critically depends on individual 
incentives. People continue to make choices assuming that the socialist constraints are still partially valid. 
On the hand we would expect the shop owner who was raised in the Soviet Union to abandon his 
condescending attitude toward customers quite quickly if his income depends on how customers are 
treated. On the other hand, agency beliefs and attitudes toward socialism are not just behavioral rules as in 
7the case of the customer care. They have become part of an individual‟s identity a concept that recently 
surfaced in economics [Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Chong, Guillen, Rios, 2010]. People‟s identity, the 
belief about who they are depends on it. Any change of such a fundamental concept as people‟s own self, 
needs to be justified and cannot be achieved over night. Imagine an American male who was raised 
believing in manly virtues (resilience, strength, stoicism, etc) as characterized by the game of football 
who is then plugged into a 17
th century French aristocratic court. We would expect such an individual to 
engage in an inner struggle. He knows that this environment demands a new understanding of his manly 
self which involves appreciation of poetry, dance and sophisticated conversation but he would find this 
transition to be a hard one nevertheless. The topic of inert preferences and beliefs as an instance of mental 
rule following behavior has been developed in more detail elsewhere [Runst, working paper] and has been 
empirically validated [Alesina &Fuchs-Schuendeln, 2007; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997; Runst, working 
paper].  
It is important to note that inert beliefs and preferences have a twofold effect. First, they feed 
back into the policy sphere. If people do not change their beliefs they will display different voting 
behavior. In East Germany, 27% of the population voted for the socialist party 20 years after 
reunification. If the constitutional basis for a market economy is not strong enough policy reversals may 
follow.  In the present paper I am primarily concerned with the second, direct effect of beliefs and 
preferences on individual action. It is hypothesized that market entrepreneurship as measured by rates of 
new self-employment can be negatively affected by the typical beliefs and preferences individuals in East 
Germany have developed. 
 
II.  Mind, Alertness & Entrepreneurial Action  
 
The resurgence of scholarly interest in entrepreneurship can be traced back to the seminal works 
by Kirzner (1979, 1985). In contrast, to Shane and Venkataram (2000), he regards entrepreneurship as an 
element of choice that pertains to all human activity and is not confined to the supply of goods and 
services. Kirzner describes his theory as a necessary tool in order to overcome the problems of 
8microeconomics. Without the entrepreneurial role it is not conceivable how we should move from a 
period of disequilibrium toward a situation where consumer desires and productive capacities are properly 
aligned. The central part of this theory is occupied by the concept of “alertness”. Every individual is a 
potential entrepreneur and ultimately becomes one by discovering a profit opportunity. This discovery 
process is not a function of increased knowledge. In fact, even if the individual holds the same stock of 
knowledge in consecutive periods, she can discover an opportunity that was previously overlooked. If the 
hunch turns out to be correct, this individual becomes the first person that has spotted this arbitrage profit, 
seizes it and pushes the price toward equilibrium. Alertness is costless because it is a byproduct of human 
conscious existence and it is not subject to choice.  
   Despite his crucial insight into the subject, I contend that Kirzner truncates the entrepreneurial 
role. By focusing on alertness alone, it appears as if the conviction that one has spotted an arbitrage 
possibility automatically translates into all the necessary action steps that generate a profit in case the 
initial insight was indeed correct. In reality, the initial “aha” moment would surely not suffice. The saying 
“build a better mousetrap and the world will build a path to your door” ignores the complex, uncertain 
and laborious intermediate tasks required if one intends to sell a product. If a potential profit opportunity 
is spotted it is not guaranteed that the visionary does in fact act upon it even if he is convinced of its 
existence. The wanna-be-entrepreneur might feel overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problems ahead 
or feel incompetent in the face of it. That does not mean the opportunity does not exist, but simply that the 
task is not taken up. Thus the feeling of infeasibility must not be subsumed under the heading of alertness 
which speaks to the discovery of an opportunity. If the individual opts out during the entrepreneurial 
process it does not even mean that, she/he in fact thinks that the task is an impossible one in general. It 
simply means that she/he holds the belief that the task is an impossible one for her/him at that specific 
moment in time. She might think that her/his current life circumstances with two young children would 
not allow for the successful conclusion of her/his plan, but hopes to return to the task at a later date.  
The subjective probability which the individual has attached to entrepreneurial success might well 
have been too low and if the person had continued she/he would have been rewarded. In direct opposition 
to Kirzner‟s smooth and direct link between alertness and action, her/his inner struggle might have been a 
9fierce one. Yet, a feeling of incompetency might be well engrained in her/him which finally leads her/him 
to surrender. On the other hand, her/his neighbor across the could have the same insight and act upon it 
because he/she believes more strongly in his ability. It is precisely because entrepreneurship is linked to 
personality that human resource managers and head hunters spend time on screening for such character 
traits as resilience and self-confidence. 
  Kirzner‟s conception of entrepreneurship does not do justice to the procedural character of 
entrepreneurship either. Individuals do not see all the necessary action steps at once. They are not 
revealed in one major epiphany. Rather, it‟s a complex process where alertness is but the first step. Once 
the individual is sufficiently convinced that the lure of revenue indeed exists, he will start utilizing more 
and more resources toward its realization. These first steps might well take the form of cautious probing 
after which more and more effort is spent on the realization of the goals. When the financial feasibility is 
reviewed, the land prices and the suitability of the alternative properties are estimated, and the availability 
of compatible employees is assessed, the alert individual might be willing to make the final plunge into 
the project.  In fact, it might not even be possible to pinpoint an exact time when the individual has turned 
entrepreneur.  
Entrepreneurship properly understood is thus not costless
2. The probing and evaluation takes up 
resources. Entrepreneurship is a complex process and not a single moment in time. The steps that are 
necessary to bring the project to fruition cannot be anticipated fully because the future is inherently 
uncertain. The entrepreneurial process is affected by one‟s agency beliefs. A more cautious person with a 
constant fear of failure, who thinks that her/his own action have very little impact on outcomes, will 
estimate a different subjective probability of success than a person who believes in her/his own ability and 
who has a high degree of resilience. In contrast to Harper (2003) who argues that agency beliefs affect if 
and how profit opportunities are discovered, I claim that not only alertness, but more importantly, the 
willingness to engage in the costly entrepreneurial process is affected by Locus of Control and Efficacy 
beliefs 
                                                           
2 For a different critique of Kirzner that is also based on his notion of ‘costless’ entrepreneurship see Casson & 
Wadeson (2007) 
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III.  Post-Socialist Culture & The Entrepreneurial Process in East Germany 
 
For the purpose of this empirical study I define entrepreneurship narrowly [Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000]. It is not defined as the general discovery of unnoticed opportunities but will 
exclusively be applied to individuals who open businesses, i.e. they become self-employed. This is a 
particular manifestation of entrepreneurship, albeit an important one. Although initial measures of job 
creation by new firms [see Birch, 1979] have been biased upwards [Haltwanger and Krizan, 1999] start 
ups are an important contributor to employment and innovation [Reynolds, 1987] and was found to affect 
GDP growth positively [Audretsch et al, 2002; Audretsch and Thurik, 2002]. The debate on the relation 
between entrepreneurship and aggregate variables is not yet settled [see for instance Carree & Thurik, 
2008; Fritsch & Mueller, 2008; Acs & Mueller, 2008; and Praag & Versloot, 2007 for an overview]. 
There also exists a wide literature on entrepreneurship in central and eastern European transitional 
economies in general [ Peng, Mike W., 2006; Tyson et al, 1994; Smallbone & Welter, 2001; Earle & 
Sakova, 2000;  Meyer & Peng, 2005; McMillan & Woodruff, 2002; Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2010; Aidis & 
Estrin, 2008; Frye & Shleifer, 1997]. In this paper, I will exclusively focus on east and west Germany.  
Figure one displays newly founded firms by inhabitants of the former socialist state, adjusted for 
population size, and as a fraction of western startups. Especially in 1991 and 1992, new eastern startups 
exceed western ones many times as the restrictions on private enterprising were lifted and entrepreneurs 
rushed in to fill the market gaps. After this initial spike, the number of eastern entrepreneurial ventures 
fluctuates around the western one. It is likely that potential entrepreneurs caught up on human capital in 
this period which enabled them to enter self-employment.  It is fair to say that by 1996, the reunification 
boom had largely faded out. During the following 12 years the polynomial trend line (of degree 2) is 
consistently below one. Starting in the year 2000 however, eastern startup counts increase slowly and 
steadily relative to western ones.  In 2005, the gap had shrunk to 15 percent.  
 
Insert Fig.1 about here 
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The claims I make in the empirical part of this paper tie together the two literatures of 
institutional/transition economics and entrepreneurship research. Specifically I test whether agency 
beliefs that were shaped by 40 years of socialism can explain some portion of the gap in self-employment 
in East and West Germany between 1996 and 2004. Similarly, I claim that a rejecting attitude toward the 
market process leads people to prefer employment over firm creation. If the market is seen as chaotic and 
unjust an individual prefers to not be seen as a profiteer who is entangled in political relationships in order 
to make things happen.    
Empirical Entrepreneurship scholars have argued that individuals with strong agency beliefs, who 
affirm free market institutions and private property [e.g. Kaufmann et al, 1995; Beugelsdijk & 
Noorderhaven, 2005; KfW, 2008] choose to be self-employed more frequently. Psychological 
entrepreneurship research was pioneered by McClelland (1961), and Hofstede (1980) and is not without 
critics [see Gartner, 1988, and more recently Beugelsdijk & Smeets, 2008]. Recent scholars in the 
Psychology literature find that the two relevant determinants of entrepreneurship appear to be weaker in 
the east. First - agency beliefs. Oettingen et al. (1994) find that beliefs in self-efficacy is underdeveloped 
in East German School Children based on the analysis of survey results from over 800 children about 
three months after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Frese et al (1996) have shown that East Germans display 
lower levels of initiative, where initiative can be defined as an active approach to work where the 
individual goes beyond what‟s formally required. They present evidence that this effect is explained 
better by socialization than by selection. Their results are based on about 1,300 qualitative interviews.  
Second – affirmation of private ownership and the rejection of external intervention. On the basis of the 
German Socio-economic panel data set, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) show that preferences are 
not exogenous, but shaped by years of communism. They conclude „East Germans are much more pro 
state than West Germans‟.  
 
IV.  Competing Hypotheses  
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There are several hypotheses competing with a cultural explanation. First, following North (1990) 
authors who have studied transition economies and entrepreneurship naturally focus on differences in 
formal institutions. Sound formal institutions reduce uncertainty and provide structures to guide 
individual human interactions. For example, the risk of state predation determines whether entrepreneurs 
will inefficiently circumvent the official sector and enter the shadow economy. Alternatively, individuals 
may enter the state sector itself if the profits to be made exceed the ones in the private sector[Baumol, 
1996]. Formal institutional variance must be seen as a fundamental explanation for differences in 
economic development. As Boettke (2001) asks:  „Where is the example to the contrary? Where has an 
economic system which can be characterized as respecting private property, maintaining sound money, 
free pricing, and freedom of contract collapsed into economic deprivation?‟  Therefore, in order to 
explain the entrepreneurial gap between East and West Germany, the first task must be to confront claims 
of formal institutional variation. Johnson et al (1998) for example show that countries with lower 
institutional quality and higher incidents of corruption exhibit a larger informal sector. Multiple studies 
have shown that there exist a clear and stable relationship between economic freedom, FDI, and growth 
[e.g.Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles, 2003; Easton & Walker, 1997]. Similarly, Frye and Shleifer (1997) 
suggest that institutional quality explains the gap in economic performance between Poland Russia after 
1990.  Aidis & Estrin (2008) show empirically that institutional quality explains different start-up rates in 
Eastern Europe. However, Estrin & Mickiewicz (2010) show that institutional differences cannot fully 
explain lower rates of self-employment in eastern European transition economies.  
Second, lower levels of entrepreneurship in the East could be caused by tighter credit constraints 
there than in West. East German Individuals did not own valuable assets that could serve as collateral at 
the time of the reunification. However, this constraint becomes less important when we consider the 
multitude of government sponsored investment subsidies, the subsidies in question included write offs 
that covered up to 50 percent of investment costs and other investment subsidies that covered between 8 
and 12 percent of costs between 1990 and 1995 and investment supplements which covered up to 23 
percent of founding investments plus infrastructure. Medium sized companies could receive up to 35 
13percent of inexpensive loans. In addition, multiple support programs provided by the KfW (Kreditanstalt 
für Wiederaufbau), the DtA (Deutsche Ausgleichsbank) and the EU offered additional assistance [see 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1991]. In 1999, the federal-, country- and community level government 
investment support expenditures for East Germany accounted for € 17.6 billion ($ 19.3 billion); which 
amounts to about € 1350 ($1485) per capita
3, or  roughly € 37,250 ($ 41,000) per self-employed person
4.  
28-58% of all companies were subsidized between 1997 and 2001 [IWH, 2003, p.4-11], which means that 
those entrepreneurs who were supported received considerably more than those figures suggest. 
Furthermore, infrastructural services provided by the state, such as the construction of road and rail access 
to manufacturing sites are not included in the above figures. 
Third, lower levels of human capital could be an obstacle to entrepreneurship. Bird et al. (1994) 
and Franz and Steiner (2000) find the returns to human capital in the form of schooling in east  Germany 
were quite high after 1990, whereas the returns to socialist job market experience was small. Thus, lower 
levels of human capital are caused by a lack of experience, not formal education. The latter authors, 
however, also find that after 1990, the return to job market experience in the east increases rapidly for 
those individuals who keep their jobs [Franz and Steiner,2000, p,260]. Thus, individuals in the east 
caught up with their western peers. 
  Fourth, if many potential entrepreneurs migrated from east to west; the east might have been 
trapped in an adverse selection scenario where only those people remain who are least likely to open a 
business. In fact, between 1991 and 2003, about 850,000, or almost 6 percent of the overall population, 
have moved to the West [see Bundesregierung, 2004]. In order to test for adverse selection, I will 
examine the likelihood of opening a business for people who were born in East Germany but moved to 
the west compared to the ones who remain in the East. In order to show that adverse selection is not the 
primary driver of the self-employment gap I will use the variable “born in the east” throughout the 
analysis.  
                                                           
3 Note that the average exchange rate of about 1.1 was exceptionally low in 1999. 
4 Assuming that 3.5% of all individuals are self-employed - according to the Statistical Office for the state of 
Thuringia [Thüringer Landesamt für Statistik, Erfurt 2008] 
14Finally, infrastructural disadvantages, especially traffic infrastructure, in the east raise the cost of 
entrepreneurial ventures and could be responsible for the lower start up count. In order to rule out this 
effect I present and compare a measure of infrastructure below. Furthermore, I will control for the most 
important remaining „traditional‟ determinants of self-employment suggested in the literature, namely: 
unemployment, gender, marital status and age (see table one). If an individual cannot find gainful 
employment he/she may be pushed into self-employment in order to generate income. Men are expected 
to have a higher likelihood of self-employment because of different risk attitudes between men and 
women, lack of career interruptions through child birth and comparatively lower involvement in domestic 
tasks. Being married may have a negative effect on the self-employment variable because it increases risk 
aversion. However, it has been argued that it can have a positive effect when monitoring costs when 
family members are working in the newly founded firm [see Borjas, 1986]. Younger individuals are more 
likely to open a business as they possess less wealth they respond to earning opportunities more strongly, 
and the wages they can obtain in employment are comparatively lower to older individuals with more 
specialized work experience and tenure.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
V.  Data & Methods 
 
In accordance with the literature I run binary probit regressions in order to overcome the problem of 
probabilities outside the zero to one range of the Linear Probability Model.  I am using the German Socio 
Economic Panel (GSOEP) collected by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) for the years 
between 1990 and 2007. For a more detailed description consult Wagner, Gert G. (2007). The dependent 
variable „Become‟ is equal to one if the individual opens a business in a specific year throughout the 
1996-2004-period. The variable „born_east‟ equals one if the person was born in the eastern part of 
Germany before 1989, and zero if the person was born in the western part. Since most entrepreneurs are 
between 20 and 60 years old, and the period of interest lies between 1995 and 2005, this variable captures 
satisfactorily whether the person was socialized in the east or the west. Foreigners have been excluded 
15from the sample. „Exp‟ represents labor market experience and is measured in years. For easterners, I 
have only counted years worked in post-socialist organizations. Finally, I have included a dummy that 
denotes if the person owns territorial or residential property („house‟). In table two, all variables are 
summarized. Please consult the appendix for a correlation matrix. 
Individuals who are working in the construction sector have been omitted from the data set, 
deleting about 10,000 of overall 266,000 observations. The construction industry boom was fueled by 
government expenditures throughout the early 1990s, be they in the form of infrastructural construction 
(roads, utilities, school, etc) or on the individual level, subsidies for home improvement and new 
construction in order to raise house ownership.  Counting construction sector self-employment would 
introduce an upward bias in favor of the east. However, the bias is small and the change in results is 
almost zero if construction is included in the analysis.   
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
VI.  Testing  Traditional Explanations 
The institutional environments in the eastern and western part of Germany are almost identical. On 
October 3
rd, 1990, the formerly socialist GDR joined the Federal Republic of Germany and adopted all its 
legal and political institutions. Yet, given that the two Germanys are at different stages in their economic 
development, the modern institutions that are consumed as a luxury good in the west could be 
inappropriate for the relatively backward economic situation in the east. Specifically, the generous 
welfare arrangements are potentially less distortionary on the labor market in the west, including self-
employment.  Therefore, if the formal sector in the east is rendered unattractive due to a lack of economic 
freedom, specifically high tax rates and regulations, we would expect to see a comparatively larger 
informal sector. Indeed, according to Schneider (2003) the estimated average size of the shadow economy 
for central and eastern European transition economies for 2000/2001 amounts to 29.2 percent of GDP, 
where Macedonia ranks highest (45.1 %) and Slovakia and the Czech Republic lowest (18.3 and 18.4 %). 
Thus, the size of the shadow economy is inversely related to institutional quality. In comparison, 
16Germany‟s shadow economy was estimated at 16.3 percent of GDP. The author also presents the results 
from the earlier IFAK-study (1998) which is based on about 1,000 telephone surveys. Here, 22 percent of 
all individuals engaged in informal sector exchanges. East Germany‟s figure was, however, considerably 
lower (12.9%) than the western one (24.5%). These results are confirmed by a different estimation 
method (Schneider, 2001) where individual East German states are shown to lie below the total average 
size of Germany‟s shadow economy.  Of course, these estimates are inherently noisy. However, exact 
numbers are not needed for the purpose of this paper. It is sufficient to recognize the smaller size of the 
informal sector in East Germany in both studies. These figures contradict an institutional explanation for 
the gap in self-employment because, as I have argued, one would have expected to find a larger informal 
sector in the East. Moreover, if there are more informal entrepreneurs in the west compared to the east, 
the gap in formal sector self-employment underestimates the true size of the gap. Furthermore, Estrin 
&Mickiwicz (2010) have also shown empirically that institutional quality cannot fully explain differences 
in rates of self-employment. 
In treatment (1) reported in table three the plain effect of the variable „born_east‟ is displayed. 
Simply being born in the east reduces the likelihood of self-employment by 0.09 or 0.12 percent. As the 
average likelihood of opening a business in the sample is 0.59 percent being born in the east reduces the 
likelihood by 17 percent in the nine years from 1996 to 2004. Controlling for the variables discussed 
above actually increases the entrepreneurial gap between east and west [treatment (2)].  In accordance 
with the literature, having been fired, being male and a University degree increase the likelihood of being 
self-employed, where involuntary unemployment has the strongest and a tertiary degree the lowest effect. 
Being married has a negative effect on self-employment, providing evidence that risk aversion increases 
with the presence of a family. The experience function is U-shaped. Further analysis shows that there are 
considerable initial gains from experience (up to 12 years), after which additional experience starts to 
have a negative effect.  The age dummies confirm that younger individuals, starting age 25, are more 
likely to become self-employed than older ones. Treatment (3) tests for the presence of credit constraints. 
Despite the fact that owning a property or a house raises the likelihood of being self-employed (thus 
confirming the negative impact of credit constraint), its effect on the entrepreneurial gap between east and 
17west is miniscule. Treatment (4) tests for adverse selection as it is the only treatment that uses the “living-
in-the-east” variable (east), and not the “born-in-the-east” variable (born_east). In fact, the presence of 
adverse selection can be confirmed. People who live in the east display a wider entrepreneurial gap than 
the people who were born in the east. In fact, the likelihood of becoming self-employed for the 9 percent 
of easterners in the sample who relocated to the west is about 1.1 percent, almost twice as large as the 
total average for Germany.  
Including and examining the control variables that are used in the literature, we are left with an 
average 27 percent fewer start ups in Germany‟s east compared to its western parts that cannot be 
explained by credit constraints, education or adverse selection. I will thus, examine the fifth hypothesis: 
infrastructure.  Figure two illustrates the traffic infrastructure of East Germany as a fraction of the West. I 
have used the length of roads per 1000 square kilometer as a proxy [see BMVBS, 2008]. The main 
disadvantage of this measure is its neglect of quality aspects. Traffic infrastructure is the largest 
component in terms of total government infrastructure expenditure (30 percent) [Uhde, 2009]. The effect 
of the second largest component, schooling (22 percent), is already incorporated in the „TertEdu‟ measure 
I have presented above. As we can see in figure two, the traffic infrastructure can hardly explain the 
pattern of self-employment displayed in figure one. It is possible that the expansion of the road network 
from about 66 to 75 percent of the western level between 1991 and 1996 has contributed to the initial 
spike in eastern rates of self-employment. Yet, the subsequent fall and slow recovery must be caused by 
different factors as the fractional length of the road network remains almost constant over the whole 
period. 
 
Insert Fig. 2 about here 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
VII.  Testing Cultural Hypotheses 
   
18  In this section, I present test results that shed some light on whether cultural factors can explain 
the self-employment gap. In general, if the cultural hypotheses are true, eastern entrepreneurs should be 
younger than western ones. The reason is that younger individuals will have spent a proportionally larger 
fraction of their life under market conditions and will therefore, have been influenced less by socialist 
culture. In fact, during the period 2005-2007 that exhibits the highest degree of convergence in 
entrepreneurship rates in the two parts of Germany, eastern entrepreneurs are two years younger, on 
average, than their western peers (38.8 and 40.8, respectively). More specifically, the GSOEP data set 
includes several variables that allow us to test the (1.) locus of control and the (2.) statism hypothesis.  I 
have also used a (3.) general confidence variable as it might pick up a feeling self-confidence, which is a 
component of agency beliefs. Three appropriate dummies have been constructed (see table one):  For 
locus of control (1.) I haves used two questions that ask for the importance of luck and fate in the 
individuals life (for the years 1994 through 1996) In terms of statism (2.), I have used five questions that 
ask whether a certain aspects of life should be controlled by the state or left to private forces (care for 
financial security of unemployed, elderly, sick, people who need care and families for the years 1997 and 
2002). The confidence variable (3.) was directly available in the data set for the years 1995 through 1997. 
Cronbach‟s alphas for „state‟ and „nocontrol‟ are 0.67 and 0.64 respectively. Another variable that 
captures the experience of low control over one‟s life („soc_cond‟) is equal to one if the individual feels 
that his or her life is dominated by social conditions. „Soc_cond‟ is unfortunately only available for the 
year 1999 and responses for that year had to be used for earlier years in order to create comparability. The 
bias will be small given that personality traits display high correlations over time. Unreported regression 
results also suggest that effects are similar if one narrows the analysis to the years 1999 to 2004.        
  As you can see in table 4, treatment (1), „Nocontrol‟ negatively affects the likelihood of self-
employment in a statistically significant way. Its magnitude (-0.16 percent) must be seen as moderately 
strong if we recall that the average likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur equals 0.59 percent. The 
„borne_east‟ variable, which denotes eastern origin, falls to 0.0014, once the additional control variable 
has been added. This finding provides evidence for the first part of the cultural explanation as it means 
that the gap was partly caused by East German‟s beliefs. In treatment (2) and (3), a stronger preference 
19for state control has a greater influence on the likelihood of self-employment (-0.19 percent) and the 
effect of being born in the east declines to 0.11 percent. In treatment (3) I have add the confidence 
dummy. Although it does affect the dependent variable, it does not appear to impact the East-West gap in 
any meaningful magnitude. Treatment (4) uses the „soc_cond‟ variable instead of LOC and the results are 
similar. The east-west gap declines to 0.09 percent. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
 
Finally, it should also be true that a certain group of individuals with unusually high exposure to 
markets during the period of socialism will significantly differ from individuals without such exposure.  
We expect black market entrepreneurs to hold beliefs and preferences that are less adjusted to life under 
socialism. Elsewhere [Runst, working paper] I have shown that individuals who operated in the shadow 
economy in east Germany before 1990 are less likely to belief in external locus of control or that their life 
is dominated by social conditions, they are more likely to belief in internal locus of control, and they 
demand less state intervention than non-black-market entrepreneurs. Table 6 shows, these individuals are 
also more likely to become self-employed after the reunification of Germany. The dummy „black market‟ 
is equal to one if the individuals answered yes to the following question in the 1990 interview wave: 
“Aside from job, school, household or retirement earnings, do you pursue one or more of the following 
activities? - Doing occasional work for pay”. 
In summary, I have found that two cultural differences, locus of control and preferences for state 
intervention account for at least one third of the gap in self-employment between East and West 
Germany. To the extent that these variables only partially reflect the deep underlying personality 
difference, it is likely that they underestimate the true magnitude. A third cultural difference, confidence, 
did not appear to be an important factor, although it does increase the likelihood of self-employment. 
 
20VIII.  Robustness & Causality 
The results of unreported linear probability models are similar to probit results. The effects of being 
born in the east and the effects of psychological variables are slightly stronger. When psychological 
variables are included in this specification the gap shrinks by more than one third.  Also, including the 
construction sector changes the results very little – psychological variables are still found to explain about 
30% of the gap.  
A fixed-effects OLS specification that would address omitted variable problems could not be run for 
the whole sample as the variables „east‟ is time independent. Similarly „nocontrol‟ is time independent 
because it is only available for the years 1994-96. However, running the FE specification for the eastern 
sample shows that „state‟ is borderline significant at the 10 percent level and the coefficient is - 0.0032, 
thus supporting the main results.  
In order to address the direction of causality the „state‟ variable was then constructed differently. It is 
now coded one if the individual favors state intervention more than the sample average in 1997, instead of 
1997 and 2002. This does not change results significantly – the two variables can still explain almost 30 
percent of the gap. This strengthens the claim for a causal impact of beliefs as it shows that beliefs and 
preferences for state action held prior to the transition into self employment affects the probability of such 
a transition.     
 
IX.  Conclusion 
In this paper I have attempted to explain the gap in rates of self employment in East and West 
Germany after the reunification of the country. It was argued that individuals under socialism develop 
certain beliefs and preferences in response to their particular life circumstances in planned economies. In 
opposition to Kirzner‟s theory of costless opportunity discovery, it was argued that entrepreneurship is a 
process, and can be affected by these beliefs and preferences.  It was shown that „traditional‟ determinants 
of self-employment cannot fully account for the gap in self-employment between east and west. 
Variations in the formal institutional environment, credit constraints, human capital, adverse selection and 
21infrastructure were tested. It was suggested that the unique socialist history in East Germany exerted a 
persistent but declining influence on the beliefs and preferences of its inhabitants and temporarily reduced 
rates of self-employment. I have shown that two proxy variables (locus of control/ social conditions and 
preferences for state control) do in fact explain at least a third of the entrepreneurial gap.  
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Figure 1 - East German Startups as Percentage of Western Ones 
 
 





26Table 1 - Literature Overview 
Explanatory Variable  Positive Effect  Negative Effect  Synthesis and 
Supportive Evidence 
1.  Traditional Factors 
Education   Borjas (1986), Rees & Shah 
(1986), Evans & Leighton 
(1989), and Robinson & 
Sexton (1994) 
Evans (1989), de Wit & 
van Winden (1989) and 
de Wit (1993) 
U-shaped relationship 
Blanchflower‟s (2000) 
Uhlaner & Thurik (2004) 
KfW (2008),  Grilo & 
Thurik (2004), Delmar & 
Davidsson (2000) 








Positive effect on micro 
level, negative effect if 
macro data is used 
Credit Constraints  Bernhardt (1994), Kidd 
(1993) 
   
Male  Blanchflower (2000), Grilo 
& Thurik (2004), KfW 
(2008) 
   
Married  Borjas (1986), Bernhardt 
(1994) 




Brock & Evans (1986), Rees 
& Shah (1986), Borjas & 
Bronars (1989), Kidd (1993), 
Grilo & Thurik (2006), KfW 
(2008) 
  Inversely U-shaped, 
Most entrepreneurial 
between age 25-45 
2.  Psychological Factors 




KfW (2008); Beugelsdijk & 
Noorderhaven(2005); Utsch 
(2004) 
   
Believe in Private 
Ownership 
Beugelsdijk & Noorderhaven 
(2005) Utsch (2004) 
   
Agency Beliefs 
(LOC) 
Beugelsdijk & Noorderhaven 
(2005), Utsch (2004); 
Schiller & Crewson (1997), 
Evans & Leighton (1989), 
Kaufmann et al (1995) 












East  East  West 
          become 
 
equals one when person becomes self-employed in that 
year  0.0062  0.0056  0.0056  0.0063 
born_east 
 
equals one if person was born in east  0.289  1.000  0.960  0.000 
east 
 
… if person lives in east  0.272  0.899  1.000  0.007 
age 
 
age in years  46.560  45.720  46.273  47.390 
age25_30 
 
equals one if person's age lies between 25 and 30  0.088  0.100  0.087  0.081 
age30_35 
   
0.115  0.116  0.096  0.118 
age35_40 
   
0.127  0.123  0.105  0.133 
age40_45 
   
0.123  0.123  0.111  0.123 
age45_50 
   
0.109  0.110  0.103  0.109 
male  
 
equals one if person is male  0.461  0.449  0.454  0.466 
tertEdu 
 
… if person has obtained tertary educational degree  0.175  0.229  0.221  0.155 
fired 
 
… if person was laid off  0.024  0.037  0.036  0.017 
married 
 
… if person is cohabiting with spouse or partner  0.605  0.582  0.530  0.617 
exp 
 
labor market experience  in a market economy in years  13.060  7.921  6.980  15.771 
expsqu 
 
labor market experience squared  321.910  82.080  83.980  438.700 
house 
 
equals one if person owns house or property  0.088  0.057  0.058  0.108 
nocontrol 
 
equals one if person feels he/she has no control over life  0.451  0.492  0.491  0.445 
Soc_cond 
 
… if the person feels that social conditions have a strong 
influence over one‟s life  0.649  0.733  0.733  0.607 
state 
 
… if person prefers state solution over private 
arrangements  0.340  0.471  0.466  0.288 
confident 
 







28Table 3 - Regression Results - Binary Dependent Variable: Self-employed 
             
Probit Marginal Effects 






(3)  (4) 
Years  96-04  98-04  96-04  98-04  01-04  96-04 
             
             
Born_east  -.0009**  -.0013***  -.0016***  -.0019***  -0.0016***  -.0017*** 
           
(living in the east) 
Male 
   
.0027***  .0026***  .0028***  .0027*** 
             
Tert_Edu 
   
.0050***  .0051***  .0050***  .0050*** 
             
Experience 
   
.000006  -.00003  .000006  .000003 
             
Experience^2 
   
-0.000006**  -.0000004**  -.000003*  -.000003* 
             
Fired 
   
.0114***  .0105***  .0116***  .0114*** 
             
Age25_30 
   
.0044***  .0038***  .0031***  .0043*** 
Age30_35 
   
.0060***  .0056***  .0057***  .0060*** 
Age35_40 
   
.0050***  .0048***  .0031***  .0050*** 
Age40_45 
   
.0044***  .0043***  .0039***  .0044*** 
Age45_50 
   
.0037***  .0033***  .0037***  .0037*** 
             
Married 
   
-.0015***  -.0016***  -.0016***  -.0015*** 
             
Property 
       
.0027*** 
 
             
Observations  139,000  119,000  139,000  119,000  76,300  139,000 





29Table 4 – Probit Regression Results – Beliefs and Preferences 
   (1)  (2)  (3)    (4) 
Years  96-04  96-04  96-04    99-04 
       
   
Born_east  -.0014***  -.0011***  -.0011***  Born_east  -0.0009** 
 
     
   
Male  .0026***  .0025***  .0025***  Male  0.0022*** 
 
     
   
Tertiary Edu  .0045***  .0043***  .0042***  Tertiary Edu  0.0029*** 
 
     
   
Experience  -0.000022  0.00003  0.00003  Experience  -0.00006 
 
     
   
Experience^2  -.000003**  -.00003**  -.00003**  Experience^2  -0.00000 
 
     
   
Fired  .0113***  .00113***  .0113***  Fired  .0102*** 
 
     
   
Age25_30  .0045***  .0045***  .0043***  Age25_30  0.0028*** 
Age30_35  .0061***  .0061***  .0059***  Age30_35  0.0049*** 
Age35_40  .0050***  .0049***  .0049***  Age35_40  0.0048*** 
Age40_45  .0044***  .0043***  .0043***  Age40_45  0.0041*** 
Age45_50  .0036***  .0035***  .0035***  Age45_50  0.0035*** 
 
     
   
Married  -0.0015***  -.0014***  -.0014***  Married  -0.0016*** 
 
     
   
NoControl  -.0016***  -.0011***  -.0014***  Soc_cond  -0.0016*** 
 
     
   
State 
 
-.0019***  -.0019***  State  -0.0024*** 
 
     
   
Confident 
   
.0010**  Confident  0.0007* 
       
   
Observations  139,000  139,000  139,000    85,442 
R^2  0.0593  0.0618  0.0622    0.0636 
 
 
30Table 5 - Black Market Entrepreneurs 























































































































become  Born_east   age25_30   age30_35   age35_40   age40_45 
 
age45_50  male  education  fired  married  exp  expsqu  nocont~l  state  confident 
become  1                               
Born_east  -0.0053*  1                             
age25_30  0.0172*  0.0033  1                           
age30_35  0.0319*  -0.0298*  0.0738*  1                         
age35_40  0.0260*  -0.0215*  -0.1189*  0.0597*  1                       
age40_45  0.0169*  0.0014  -0.1165*  -0.1350*  0.0523*  1                     
age45_50  0.0066*  0.0037  -0.1087*  -0.1259*  -0.1334*  0.0592*  1                   
male  0.0200*  -0.0154*  -0.0067*  0.0021  0.0008  -0.0024  0.0052  1                 
edu  0.0327*  0.0913*  -0.0338*  0.0243*  0.0448*  0.0652*  0.0753*  0.0883*  1               
fired  0.0323*  0.0565*  0.0325*  0.0249*  0.0189*  0.0161*  0.0170*  0.0373*  -0.0180*  1             
married  -0.0099*  -0.0309*  -0.1669*  -0.0131*  0.0865*  0.1242*  0.1258*  0.0461*  0.1051*  -0.0203*  1           
exp  -0.0180*  -0.2664*  -0.2259*  -0.1639*  -0.0909*  -0.0100*  0.0653*  0.3041*  0.0197*  -0.0326*  0.2417*  1         
expsqu  -0.0212*  -0.3030*  -0.1819*  -0.1775*  -0.1434*  -0.0815*  -0.0048  0.2919*  -0.0212*  -0.0390*  0.1673*  0.9523*  1       
nocontrol  -0.0168*  0.0697*  0.0196*  0.0227*  0.0074*  -0.0054*  -0.0117*  -0.0629*  -0.1355*  0.001  0.0655*  0.0377*  0.0105*  1     
state  -0.0180*  0.1933*  0  0.0155*  0.0158*  0.0069*  -0.0169*  -0.0079*  -0.0542*  0.0174*  0.0385*  -0.0147*  -0.0390*  0.2933*  1   
confident  0.0072*  0.0095*  0.0796*  0.0956*  0.0649*  0.0230*  -0.0074*  0.0122*  0.0315*  -0.0084*  0.0452*  -0.0183*  -0.0359*  0.3260*  0.1299*  1 
*An Asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level 
 
32